ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL RECOURSE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES.*
Progressive as this country has in many ways been from
the first, it was very slow to grasp the idea that a citizen
should be able to bring the Government into court in civil
suits as readily as he can bring an individual or a corporation; and while it is now more than forty years since a court
was established in which the United States could be sued.
and thousands of judgments have been rendered against it.
yet even at this day the jurisdiction of that court, broad as
it undoubtedly is, does not embrace all reasonable causes
of action.
The most striking instance of the injustice from which
American citizens suffered for nearly eighty years after the
adoption of the Constitution, through inability to enforce
by legal process the Government's obligations towards them.
is that of the French Spoliation Claims, so well known to
the descendants of the merchants and shipowners of the last
decade of the eighteenth century. These claims, originally
against the French Government, became, in consequence of
the treaty of 18oi, obligations of our own Government
towards its citizens, and obligations of a most sacred character, being in fact a part of the price of the independence
of the United States; but they were never recognized as
legal obligations at all, and it is only within about twenty
years that any of them were paid, while many still await
payment.
No one can read the history of the War of Independence
without realizing that without the aid of France that war
would probably have been a ghastly failure, but our his* By Charles Chauncey Binney, of the Philadelphia Bar, formerly
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tories are usually silent as to the price which the struggling
colonies agreed to pay for French aid. That price was a
guarantee, by this country to France, "forever, against all
other powers", of all the then possessions of France in
America, including the West Indies, as well as those it
might acquire by any future treaty of peace, and also a
grant of exclusive privileges in bringing prizes into our ports
in any war. It is true that the treaties of 1778 were made
with the well-meaning, if weak, Louis XVI, and not with the
bloody oligarchy who judicially murdered him in 1793, but
the so-called French Republic deemed itself the heir of the
monarchy, as far as treaty rights were concerned, and when
we stood neutral in its war with England, France severely
punished what it called our breach of faith. Though the
French Navy and privateers could do little against British
warships, they were at least able to capture some hundreds
of unarmed American merchantmen, in spite of the fact
that both countries had bound themselves to protect each
other's commerce. Of course, if the treaties of 1778 were
not binding upon us, neither were they binding on France,
so that we could not fairly charge France with treaty breaking; but the wholesale spoliations were acts of war, although
no war had been declared.
Wise diplomacy restored peaceful relations between the
two countries, and at the negotiations which ended in the
treaty of i8oi the United States presented the claims of its
citizens for losses due to the capture of their ships and cargoes by France, while that country claimed indemnity for
the failure of the United States to fulfill its obligations under
the treaties of 1778. In the end both countries renounced
their respective claims, or, in other words, the United States,
by renouncing its citizens' claims upon France for spoliations, secured a renunciation by France of all claims on our
unfulfilled guarantee of the French possessions in the West
Indies, and our other unfulfilled agreements under the
treaties of 1778, which guarantee and agreements had been
made in consideration of that military and naval aid which
enabled us to secure our independence. Hence, as already
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stated, the French spoliation claims were, in a very direct
sense, a part of the price of the independence of the United
States.
The United States having, for its own advantage, released
France from the claims of American citizens, which claims
were undoubtedly valid by the law of nations, transferred
to itself, by every principle of justice and equity, the obligation to pay those claims, especially as it had encouraged
its citizens, during the period of the spoliations, not to abandon foreign trade, and had promised them protection against
ultimate loss; but no court existed with jurisdiction to receive proof of the claims, much less to give judgment for
them. Worse than this, the obligation of the government
to pay any claims whatever, except those due by express
contract, was not yet fully recognized. Had the Court of
Claims existed in i8oi, common sense, as well as common
justice, would have required that that court be at once given
jurisdiction to hear and determine the French spoliation
claims, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court on any
disputed points of law, while the evidence was still fresh;
but as it was, no one dreamed of regarding the matter as
one for a court to handle, and the only recourse was to the
bounty of Congress.
Shortly before the ratification of the new French treaty,
there had been a change of administration at Washington,
accompanied by a similar change in Congress, and the new
administration, finding it necessary to make some pledges,
had pledged itself to economy. The merchant and underwriting classes, who had suffered from the spoliations, were
still largely opposed to the party in power, which may possibly account for the lack of any enthusiasm, on the part of
Congress, in behalf of these claims. Whatever the precise
cause, no relief was given to the claimants, and as years
rolled on, and the new States of the West came into the
Union, their representatives knew little and cared less for
the claims of Easterners, and the cause of the sufferers
from French spoliations attracted less and less support
They were not without able champions, and bills for their
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relief were repeatedly passed by one house of Congress, but
only to fail of passage in the other. Twice such a measure
successfully ran the gauntlet of both houses, but was killed
by the veto of a President who presumably knew but little
of the facts, and never suspected that he was acting in gross
violation of justice and good faith. Even when the Court
of Claims was ultimately established, all claims growing out
of any treaty stipulation were expressly excluded from its
jurisdiction, so that, as the Government's obligation toward
the French spoliation claimants grew out of the treaty of
i8oI, they remained as helpless as before.
For a long time these claims were practically abandoned
and forgotten, but finally, after every single original claimant, other than a corporation, must have gone to his grave,
the matter was revived, and the Act of January 20, 1885
(23 Stats. 283), authorized the claimants and their legal
representatives to present their claims to the Court of Claims
within two years. Most unfortunately, that court was not
authorized to give judgment, but only to decide upon the
validity of each claim presented, and to report to Congress
its conclusions of fact and law in each case, thus reserving
to that body the decision as to actual payment. The loss
of the necessary evidence (liable enough to disappear in the
course of ninety years) has barred many cases, but the
worst feature of the case has been the indisposition of Congress to pay the claims, even after their validity had been
clearly established by a thorough trial. Many of the cases
have not even yet been tried, and many which have been
favorably decided have not yet been paid. All this great
injustice could have been avoided at the start had a right
of suit been granted in i8o.

In England, from the earliest times, the property rights of
the subject, as against the crown, seem to have been more
readily enforced than, until very recently, those of the
American citizen, as against his own government, could
ever be. That somewhat apocryphal work, the "Mirrour of
Justices", says:
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It was ordained that the King's courts should be open to all plaints,
by which they had original writs without delay, as well against the King
and Queen as against any other of the people, for every inquiry save
where there is to be vengeance of life or member. (Bk. I, Chap. III,
p. ii, Seld. Soc. ed.)

This remedy was, however, more theoretical than practical, for the same work says, in regard to abuses (Bk. V.,
Chap. I, p. 156):
The first and sovereign abuse is that the King is beyond the law,
whereas he ought to be subject to it, as contained in his oath.

Chief Baron Comyns, in his Digest (Action, C. I) also
said:
Until the time of Edward I, the King might have been sued in all
cases as a common person.

. .

.

But none shall have an action

against the King, but one shall be put to sue to him by petition.

And in another place he said (Praerog., D. 78):
The King cannot be sued by writ, for he cannot command himself.

It may well be doubted whether even Saxon England was
so democratic as to admit of the king's being sued in the
soine way as a subject, but it is practically certain that there
was always some legal remedy for injuries due to the act
of the crown. By the time of Edward I, at least, this remedy was the petition of right, which was really a petition for
leave to sue. Later on the manifestation or plea of right
(monstrans de droit) came into use, and was of broader
application. Both of these proceedings could be instituted
either in the Chancery or the Exchequer, but in both of
them justice was administered as a matter of grace only.
In more recent times the petition of right was so regulated
by statute as to be made a thoroughly practical and efficient
remedy for the invasion of individual rights by the sovereign power, the fiat being granted as a matter of right to
any petitioner, whether subject or alien, except in very extraordinary cases.
The petition of right, being addressed to the sovereign in
his individual capacity, was, however, out of the question
in a country whose chief magistrate was not empowered to
consent to the bringing of a suit against the State; but one
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might have expected that in such a country, where the people
are declared to be the sovereign, and the government is simply their representative or agent, the right of the citizen
to sue his own government would be regarded as fundamental without the need of any legislation to authorize the
suit. Such is not the case, however, as regards either the
United States or the States individually. As a matter of
theory, it was not disputed that the words of the Constitu-

tion (Art. III, sec. 2), "the judicial power shall extend
to controversies in which the United States shall
be a party", were meant to refer to cases in which the government should be defendant, as well as those in which it
should be plaintiff; but this ample provision in the Constitution makes it all the more extraordinary that for nearly
eighty years after that instrument was adopted no court
existed with jurisdiction to render a binding judgment in a
suit brought against the United States.
Apparently the fact that a judgment against the
government would have to be enforced by the executive
branch of that same government was regarded as too great
a stumbling-block to be got over without legislation. Thus
in Chishoim v. Georgia (2 Dall, 419, 478), in 1793, where it
was held that citizens of one State could sue another State
in the Federal Courts, Chief Justice Jay pointed out that
the judgment would be enforced by the United States, but
he suggested that "in case of actions against the United
States, there is no power which the courts can call to their
aid". ie added:
I wish the state of society was so far improved, and the science of
government advanced to such a degree of perfection, that the whole
nation could, in the peaceable course of law, be compelled to do
justice, and be sued by individual citizens. Whether that is or is
not now the case ought not to be thus collaterally and incidentally
decided. I leave it a question.

Later judges, however, did not even treat the question as
open. On the contrary, without undertaking to reason the
matter out, they always regarded it as settled that the government could not be sued unless such a suit were authorized by statute. Thus Marshall, C. J., said in 1821, in
Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheat. 264, 411):
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The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced
or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does
not authorize such suits.

To the same effect are U. S. v. Clarke (8 Pet. 436) ; U. S.
v. McLemore (4 How. 286); Hill v. U. S. (9 How. 386).
The Act of March 3, 1797, Sec. 3 (I Stats. 514), authorized the defendant, in a suit by the United States, to set off
any claim which the accounting officers of the Treasury had
previously disallowed, and in United States v. Fillebrown (8
Pet. 28), a judgment that the United States was indebted to
the defendant in the sum of $43o was affirmed; but in De
Groot v. United States (5 Wall. 419) and United States v.
Eckford (6 Wall. 484), it was stated that no judgment could
be rendered against the Government, even though, on striking a balance, it should be judicially ascertained that the Government was indebted to the defendant. One might have
expected that the original judiciary act would have given
the district courts jurisdiction of suits against the government, but the influence of the idea, "Rex non potest peccare",
was too strong to permit of such an innovation, even though
the substitution of "Republica" for "Rex" has utterly destroyed all legal ground for the maxim, as applied to this
country. In fact, practically speaking, this maxim was
more strictly followed in America than it had been in England, for Congress gave the citizen no petition of right,
such as the Englishman had long enjoyed, and which, if
not all that could theoretically be desired, was a substantial
guarantee of justice.
This does not mean that claims against the government
could not be presented for payment. As soon as the
Treasury Department was established, the accounting officers were daily occupied in paying what the government
owed for contracts of all kinds; but if those officers refused
or cut down a claim, further relief could only be had from
Congress itself. This was a serious violation of the principle of the separation of powers, a principle which the framers of the Constitution had in the main consistently observed.
It is for Congress to enact the laws upon which the liability
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of the government to individuals depends, and also, inferentially, "to pay the debts of the United States" (Const., Art.
I, Sec. 8), but it should properly be for the courts to decide
what that liability may be in any given case, just as much
as in controversies between individuals, and -for Congress
to pass upon such a matter was an exercise of judicial power
by a legislative body-a violation of a most salutary principle, and sure to lead to grave abuses.
It is true (as stated in United States v. Realty Co., 163
U. S. 427, 440) thatUnder the provisions of the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8) Congress
has power to lay and collect taxes, etc., "to pay the debts" of the
United States. Having power to raise money for that purpose, it of
course follows that it has power when the money is raised to appropriate it to the same object.

It is also true, as stated in the same case, thatThe term "debts" includes those debts or claims which rest upon
a purely equitable or honorary obligation, and which would not be
recoverable in a court of law if existing against an individual ...
The power of Congress extends at least as far as the recognition and
payment of claims against the government which are thus founded.
To no other branch of the government than Congress could any application be successfully made on the part of the owners of such claims
or debts for the payment thereof. Their recognition depends solely
upon Congress, and whether it will recognize claims thus founded
must be left to the discretion of that body.

All this must be admitted, and yet it does not follow that
the power to appropriate the money required to pay the
debts of the United States implies also the power to decide
what debts are legal and what not. The existence of that
power was, however, assumed from the first; or it might be
truer to say that no distinction was made between claims
purporting to be legally due and those confessedly based
upon moral or honorary considerations only; and practically
all claims were presented in the form of appeals to the
bounty of Congress. At all events it is probably useless, at
this late day, to question the abstract power of Congress
to pass upon the legality of claims, but, as regards the best
interests of claimants and government alike, the exercise of
this power has long been proved undesirable. It has grad-
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ually been in great measure abandoned, and it is to be
hoped that it will ultimately be given up altogether.
Within three years from the first sitting of Congress, it
became necessary to provide some method for the investigation of claims, but while the first attempt was undoubtedly
in the right direction, it was probably impracticable, and at
all events so incomplete as to be unconstitutional. The Act
of March 23,

1792

(I

Stats. 243), required the circuit

courts to examine pension claims of invalid soldiers and
sailors of the Revolution, and to determine the rate payable
in each case, certifying their opinions to the Secretary of
War, who was authorized, however, if he suspected imposition or mistake, to withhold the pension and report the
case to Congress. Although the applicants for Revolutionary pensions were few in number compared with the pensioners of to-day, it may be doubted whether the circuit
courts could have readily handled the volume of business
thus thrust upon them, but the vital defect in the act was the
lack of finality in the judgments which were to be rendered.
Some of the courts assumed jurisdiction, at least as commissioners, but others totally refused, on the ground that
only judicial powers could be conferred upon them, which
last view was upheld by the Supreme Court. (See note to
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Yale Todd,
in note to United States v. Ferreira,13 How. 40, 52.)
Congress had evidently grasped the idea that the application of a general pension law to particular cases was not
a legislative act, and that it might be regarded as either
judicial or executive, but Congress, while anxious to escape
the drudgery of investigation, was unwilling to adopt the
logical consequences of this idea, and to surrender to any
other body the right of final decision in such cases. The
Act of 1792 might be described as a straddle, and like most
straddles it accomplished nothing. This being almost immediately realized, the Act of February 28, 1793 (i Stats.

324), changed the system, providing that the evidence in
pension cases should be taken before the district judges (sitting, of course, merely as commissioners), who were to
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transmit it to the Secretary of War, who, after procuring
further evidence from the records of his department, transmitted the cases to Congress for decision.
The necessity for some system in the handling of claims
by Congress led to the establishment of a standing committee on claims, under a rule of the House of Representatives
of November 14, 1794, "to take into consideration all such
petitions, and matters or things touching claims or demands
on the United States as shall be presented, or shall come in
question and be referred to them by the House, and to report
their opinion thereupon, together with such propositions
for relief therein as to them shall seem expedient".
Claims continuing to increase in number and variety,
standing committees were established from time to time
to deal with particular classes of them, e. g., the Committee
on Public Lands (185), on Pensions and Revolutionary
Claims (1816), on Private Land Claims (I816), on Revolutionary Pensions (1825), and on Invalid Pensions (1831).
This system practically made every Congressman the
sponsor for all the claims of his constituents, thereby not
only impairing, by the mere waste of time, the efficiency of
Congress in dealing with really important matters, but also
destroying, in the mind of the public, all proper idea of what
the position and duties of a Congressman really were. Of
course there were always many Congressmen (as there are
to-day) who enjoyed peddling out relief to individuals as
a matter of favor, without much regard to actual justice;
but the system was very galling to many men who had gone
to Congress solely to work for the public welfare. Thus a
leading member of the Philadelphia bar, who had consented
to serve his city and nation in Congress, wrote in 1834:
says he does not see now how I am to leave public life.
Mr. . Public life I Public death is the better name for it. . . . I

.

find all my powers crushed under a weight of mechanical labor, from
which I have made a positive determination to escape. I am the slave
of every man who wants anything done here, of any sort, public or
private. I dread the mail as much as a negro dreads the whip of his
driver.

That Congress itself was alone to blame in the matter was
plainly stated by Mr. Justice Story in 1833, when he wrote:
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It has sometimes been thought 'that this is a serious defect in the
organization of the Judicial Department of the National Government.
It is not, however, an objection to the Constitution itself; but it lies,

if at all, against Congress, for not having provided (as it is clearly
within their constitutional authority to do) an adequate remedy for all
private grievances of this sort in the courts of the United States.
(Story's Comm. on the Const., Sec. 1678.)

Efforts at reform were made from time to time, but without success. Thus in 1826 Mr. Edward Livingston, of Louisiana, offered a resolution:
That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire into
the expediency of establishing some mode by which all demands against
the United States for services, or for articles furnished, or moneys
advanced for their use, not allowed by the proper accounting officers,
should be submitted to a court of justice for investigation and provisional decision, reserving to Congress the right of finally deciding
whether such decisions shall be carried into effect, and also, under
the like reservation, investigating the title of individuals or bodies corporate to lands claimed by the United States.

The fatal defect in this plan was that it left the final decision with Congress, instead of the courts, but the time was
not yet ripe for even such a half-measure as this. In 1838
Mr. Thomas Henry, of Pennsylvania, suggested a more
complete reform, but with no better success. He proposed
"that the Committee of Claims be instructed on inquire into
the expediency of establishing by law a board of commissioners, for the adjustment and final settlement of all claims
against the United States". The committee itself favored
the idea, but it does not seem to have ever been embodied
in any definite bill upon which action could be taken.
Where officers of the Government occupied real estate in
the name of the United States, the owner had indeed an
adequate remedy, for it was early held that ejectment
would lie against the custodians, and that if judgment were
rendered for the plaintiff, he could recover the property,
even though the Government had erected valuable buildings
thereon. (Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, 9 Cr. ii.) In that
case the Government had acquired certain land from Indians
by treaty, but its officers had assumed the right to occupy
the plaintiff's land instead, as it was better suited to the Government's needs. Marshall, C. J., said:
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The facts, that the agents of the United States took possession of
this land lying above the mouth of the Highwassee, erected expensive
buildings thereon, and placed a garrison there, cannot be admitted to
give an explanation to the treaty, which would contradict its plain
words and obvious meaning. The land is certainly the property of
the plaintiff below; and the United States cannot have intended to
deprive him of it by violence, and without compensation. This Court
is unanimously and clearly of opinion that the Circuit Court committed
no error in instructing the jury that the Indian title was extinguished
to the land in controversy, and that the plaintiff below might sustain

his action.

This case, decided in 1815, well illustrates the utter unreasonableness of Congress in so long delaying to provide
for suits against the Government. Had the Government
taken possession of the land under a contract of sale, and had
then failed to pay the purchase-money, the plaintiff would
have been dependent on the grace of Congress for relief;
but without any contract he could effectually assert his legal
rights. Moreover, in the case of claims for customs duties
illegally exacted and paid under protest, there was a common
law remedy against the collector, provided the importer notified the collector of his intention to sue, and that the money
should not be paid over into the Treasury. This was on the
settled doctrine that "where money is illegally demanded and
received by an agent, he cannot exonerate himself from personal responsibility by paying it over to his principal, if he
has notice not to pay it over". (Elliott v. Swartwout, IO
Pet. 137, A. D. 1836.)
This remedy was, however, taken away (inadvertently,
perhaps, but none the less positively) by the Act of March
3, 1839, Sec. 2 (5 Stats. 348), requiring collectors of customs to pay over all money received for duties under protest, and not to hold it to abide the event of a suit. That
the statute had this effect was decided early in 1845 in Cary
v. Curtis (3 How. 236); and Congress being in session, relief was at once given by the Act of 26 February, 1845 (5
Stats. 727), afterwards R. S. 3011, providing that customs
duties illegally exacted and paid under protest, could be
recovered from the collector in an action at law, triable by
jury. The recourse against the government in such pro-ceedings was indirect, but this was only a matter of form,
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as the government always provided for the payment of such
judgments.
That Congress should have recognized the necessity of
providing for suits to recover duties believed to have been
illegally exacted, may be regarded as a forward step, but
its failure to see that the obligation to refund such duties
did not really stand on any higher ground than the obligation to pay money due on contracts, or any other government debts, simply shows how small a part logic plays in
American legislation.
The first measure providing for a forum in which the
citizen could bring suit directly against the government was
the Act of February 24, 1855 (io Stats. 612), establishing
the Court of Claims. As a matter of fact, this act gave
very incomplete relief, for although it established a Court
of Claims, consisting of three judges, to be appointed by
the President, and to hold office during good behavior, yet
this so-called court was not empowered to give final judgments, and hence was not really a court at all. The greater
part of the act reads as if it had been originally drafted with
the idea of providing for final judgments, but apparently
Congress could not bring itself to surrender any of its old
authority over claims, and changed the bill so as to preserve
that authority. The act required the court tohear and determine all claims founded upon any law of Congress,
or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States,
and also all claims which may be referred to said court by
either House of Congress.

The court was required to report to Congress monthly
during each session the cases acted upon, with statements
of all the material facts established by the evidence and
with their opinions as to what the decisions should be; but
these reports were also to give all the evidence in each case,
and Congress was to decide finally whether to pay the claims
or not. The court had the power to call on the departments
for information, and to issue subpcenas, and false testimony
before it was made perjury, but it was in fact only an inves-
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tigating committee to prepare cases for final action by Congress, much as a Master in Equity, by his report upon the
proceedings before him, prepares a case for final action by
the court. The security of the tenure of the judges guaranteed, as far as such a guarantee is possible, the impartiality of the tribunal, and claimants could directly institute
proceedings in it, so that its establishment was a forward
step, but it went only a little way.
The Civil War vastly increased the activities of the government and involved it in an immense number of contracts,
thereby necessarily increasing the volume of disputed claims.
In self-defence, as well as in justice to claimants, Congress
was compelled to abandon its function as a final tribunal in
all claims cases; and accordingly, by the Act of March 3,
1863 (r2 Stats. 765), it reorganized the Court of Claims.
This act was undoubtedly intended to give claimants an
opportunity to have their cases judicially heard and determined. The judges were increased to five, a seal was provided for, and the court's jurisdiction was extended to cover
all set-offs and counter-claims on the part of the United
States, but claims growing out of treaties were specifically
excepted and all proceedings not brought within six years
after the claim accrued were forever barred, subject to exceptions in cases of disability. The court was empowered
to enter judgment in all cases before it, with an appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States by either party in
cases involving over $3000, while in test cases, which would
settle the law for classes of similar claims, the government
was entitled to an appeal, without regard to the amount
involved. Judgments were to be paid out of any general
appropriation made by law for the payment of private
claims.
So far the act established a complete system of dealing
judicially with all claims within the somewhat limited jurisdiction of the court, but the act contained one short section
whose effect Congress probably failed to fully comprehend,
and which, as long as it remained in force, made the system
in great part unworkable. This section read:
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No money shall be paid out of the Treasury for any claim passed
upon by the Court of Claims, until an appropriation therefor shall be
estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury.

This section was discussed in the first case appealed under
this act (Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561; 117 U. S.,
697), which deserves careful attention, as it enables us to
understand just what the status of the Court of Claims is,
and why it is that, since the repeal of the section just referred to, its judgments are really binding on the United
States. This appeal was submitted in December, 1863,
argued January 3, 1865, and dismissed just before the close
of the term, Chief Justice Chase announcing the judgment
as follows:
We think that the authority given to the head of an executive
department by necessary implication in the Fourteenth Section of the

amended Court of Claims Act, to revise all the decisions of that court
requiring payment of money, denies to it the judicial power, from the
exercise of which alone appeals can be taken to this court. The reasons which necessitate this conclusion may be more fully announced
hereafter. At present, we restrict ourselves to this general statement,
and to the direction that the cause be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.*

The opinion which the Chief Justice said might be announced was never officially handed down, but Chief
Justice Taney, prior to his death on October 12, 1864, had
prepared an opinion expressing his own views, probably
after the court had reached a conclusion on the case as
submitted, but before an argument was ordered. This paper
was carefully considered by the court in reaching its decision
(announced March 9, 1865), and it was proposed to make
it the basis of the court's opinion, but no such opinion was
ever written. Taney's opinion was published twenty-one
years later (117 U. S., 697), and may be understood as practically official. It states that the provision that no claim
should be paid until after an appropriation therefor should
be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury meant
that.

Neither the Court of Claims nor the Supreme Court can do any-

thing more than certify their opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury,
* This statement is not found in the report of the case in 2 Wall.,
561, but is quoted in the opinion in U. S. v. Jones, xi9 U. S. 477, 478.
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and it depends upon him, in the first place, to decide whether he will
include it in his estimates of private claims, and if he should decide
in favor of the claimant, it will then rest with Congress to determine
whether they will or will not make an appropriation for its payment.
Neither court can by any process enforce its judgment, and whether
it is paid or not does not depend on the decision of either court, but
upon the further action of the Secretary of the Treasury, and of
Congress.

It was true that the obnoxious section referred only to
the estimate, and did not in terms require a specific appropriation by Congress, but the opinion held that that requirement necessarily followed.
When the Secretary asks for this appropriation, the propriety of the
estimate for this claim, like all other estimates of the Secretary, will
be opened to debate, and whether the appropriation will be made or
not will depend upon the majority of each House. The real and ultimate judicial power will, therefore, be exercised by the Legislative
Department.

. The opinion further stated that the award of execution
is an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial power, so that as neither the Court of
Claims nor the Supreme Court had, under this act, any
power to award execution, what was called a judgment was
really no judgment at all, but merely an opinion, which
would remain a dead letter unless Congress should at some
future time sanction it by a statute. As the Supreme Court
derived its powers and duties from the Constitution, Congress could not impose upon it the authority or duty (not
imposed by the Constitution) of hearing appeals from judgments which were not final, or of giving opinions in cases
where its own judgment would not be final and conclusive
upon the rights of the parties, and where no process of execution could be awarded to carry it into effect.
The Constitution delegated no judicial power to Congress;
and while it had authority to pay claims against the United
States, or to establish tribunals with special powers to examine testimony and decide, in the first instance, upon the

validity and justice of any such claim, it could not assume
authority to award or refuse execution of any judgment
rendered by a court of the United States. Such action on
its part would be an unconstitutional interference, by the leg-
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islative branch of the government, with the functions of the
judicial branch, and as Congress must always be presumed
to have intended to confine itself to its proper constitutional
functions, the statute had necessarily to be construed as creating an advisory tribunal only, not a court, and the provision for an appeal was consequently invalid.
It is probable that Congress, in requiring an estimate by
the Secretary of the Treasury, had simply meant to provide
some means of being informed that money was needed to
pay judgments, and had not foreseen the view ultimately
taken by the Supreme Court, which view was of course made
public, although no formal opinion was then handed down.
At all events, the obnoxious section was repealed by the Act
of March 17, 1866 (14 Stats. 9), and the provision for payment of judgments was left as it stood in Section 7 of the
Act of 1863 (now R. S. lo89).
The Supreme Court at once took notice of the change,
and prepared to entertain appeals from the judgments of
the Court of Claims, at last established as a court in reality
and not merely in name. The rules of the Supreme Court in
rekard to these appeals were at once drawn up and published
(3 Wall. vii), and in accordance with the opinion in Gordon
v. United States, it has ever since been recognized that a
judgment of the Court of Claims is as binding as that of
any other court, and that while the court has never been
specifically authorized to levy an execution upon government property to pay such a judgment, yet for Congress to neglect or refuse to pay it would be unconstitutional, an interference by the legislative department with
the functions of the judicial.
The first case heard on appeal, after the Act of March 17,
1866, made appeals possible, was DeGroot v. United States
(5 Wall. 419); and for twenty years thereafter no doubt
was entertained as to the right of the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases. In United States v.
Jones (119 U. S. 477, decided in 1886), the claimant's counsel moved to dismiss the Government's appeal, contending
that Section 236 of the Revised Statutes required the Treas-
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ury Department to settle and adjust all claims, and that this
interfered with the finality of the Court of Claims judgments, so that they were not appealable. That section reads:
All claims and demands whatever by the United States or against
them, and all accounts whatever in which the United States are concerned, either as debtors or as creditors, shall be settled and adjusted in
the Department of the Treasury.

The Court denied the motion, saying:
This section of the Revised Statutes is not new law. It was first
enacted as Sec. 2 of the Act of March 3, 1817, c. 45, 3 Stat. 366, and
it has been in force ever since. It evidently relates to an entirely
different class of duties from that to which the payment of the judgments of the Court of Claims belongs. As to such judgments, the duty
of the Secretary of the Treasury is to pay them out of "any general
appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private
claims, on presentation" to him "of a copy of said judgment, certified"
according to law. Rev. Stat., Sec. io8g. Of course, this applies as
well to special appropriations made for the satisfaction of the particular judgment. Under this statute the Secretary has no power whatever to go behind the judgment in his examination.
Reference is also made to an Act of March 3, i875, c. 149, 18
Stat. 481, which provides for "deducting any debt due the United States
from any judgment recovered against the United States by such debtor";
but this gives the accounting officers of the Government no authority
to re-examine the judgment. It only provides a way of payment and
satisfaction if the creditor shall, at the time of the presentation of his
judgment, be a debtor of the United States for anything except what
is included in the judgment, which is conclusive as to everything it
embraces.
It is unnecessary to pursue this branch of the case further. We are
entirely satisfied that, as the law now stands, appeals do lie to this
court from the judgments of the Court of Claims in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction.

While the Court of Claims owes its existence to Congress,
and can therefore be required to hear cases without giving
a judgment (as it does in what are called Congressional
cases), yet as far as concerns its general jurisdiction it is (and has been ever since March 17, 1866) an
inferior court of the United States, within the meaning of
Section I of Article III of the Constitution; and hence its
judges hold office during good behavior, as required by that
Constitution, and as should be required in the case of all
judicial officers, by all constitutions. In the case of this
court it is peculiarly essential that this should be so. The
contingent fee system prevails to a very large extent in the
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Court of Claims, so that the claimant's counsel has almost
always a direct interest in the result, and this being so it is
in the highest degree necessary that the impartiality of the
court be guaranteed in every possible way. It does not
appear that the court's reputation for impartiality has ever
been assailed; but as its work, though extremely varied and
important, concerns exclusively matters such as had previously been dealt with by Cong'ess, and in regard to which
the practice of what is called "lobbying" was popularly supposed (whether justly or not) to play no small part, the
reputation of the court itself, in the opinion of the public,
has probably never yet been as high as was really deserved.
The prosecution of claims seems to have been thought, most
unreasonably, an inferior species of litigation, and this unreasonable view seems to have affected the estimation of the
court itself. Gradually, however, the court has won for
itself something approaching its true position as an indispensable branch of the national judiciary. That it has done
so is probably due more to the character and labors of former Chief Justice Nott (Associate Justice from 1863 to 1897
and Chief Justice from 1897 to 19o6) than to those of any
other man.
By the Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stats. 505), commonly
called "the Tucker Act", the United States district courts
were also given jurisdiction over all matters within the general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, in cases where the
amount does not exceed $2ooo, and the United States
circuit courts were given similar jurisdiction in cases where
the amount exceeds $iooo and does not exceed $io,ooo,
but the Act of June 27, 1898, Sec. 2 (30 Stats. 494), abolished this concurrent jurisdiction in suits brought by government officers for salary or other compensation. With
this exception, any claimant can sue the United States in the
local federal courts, in cases not involving over $io,ooo,
as readily as he can in the Court of Claims, but this concurrent jurisdiction is rarely resorted to, partly because the
habit of taking all such cases to Washington could not
readily be overcome, though probably in the main because
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there are no court costs to be paid in the Court of Claims,
so that an unsuccessful litigation there involves little
expense.
Sections 9 and iO of the same Act of March 3, 1887, provide for an appeal or writ of error from decrees or judgments
of the federal, district and circuit courts in claims cases,
upon the same conditions as appeals under Section 707 of
the Revised Statutes, so that the Government is entitled to
appeal from a judgment of a district court, no matter how
small the amount involved, although in other than claims
cases such a judgment is not appealable unless the matter in
dispute exceeds the value of $5ooo. (United States v. Davis,
I31 U. S. 36.) Under that statute the appeal or writ of
error in claims cases lay directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States, but since the passage of the Act of March
3, 189i (26 Stats. 826), the several circuit courts of appeals
constitute the appellate tribunals for claims cases brought in
the local federal courts, except in cases involving matters as
to which a direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court
is provided for. It would have been more logical to make
the Supreme Court the appellate tribunal in all suits against
the Government, no matter in which court they might happen
to be brought.
The duty of defending the United States against suits
in the Court of Claims falls upon an Assistant Attorney
General, who has a number of assistant attorneys under
him, but Indian Depredation and French Spoliation cases,
probably because of their somewhat distinctive characters,
have always been treated as matters entirely apart from the
general work of what may be called the regular claims
branch of the Department of Justice, and the defence in such
cases is entrusted to other law officers of that department.
Where the government is sued in the local district or circuit
courts, the District Attorney represents it, and the case is
tried by the court without a jury.
At this point it may be well to contrast the attitude of the
National Government towards claimants with that of the
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several States of the Union. The Constitution of Pennsylvania (Art. I, Sec. II) provides:
Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner,
in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.

The Act of July io, I9O1, Sec. I (P. L. 637), provides:
That the courts of common pleas of the several counties of this
Commonwealth are hereby clothed with jurisdiction in all cases in
which the Commonwealth is a party: Provided, That nothing in this
act shall be construed to apply to tax cases to which the Commonwealth is a party.

As was noticed above in regard to the judicial power of
the United States, these words must include cases in which
the Commonwealth is defendant, but no general law authorizing such suits has ever been passed. From time to time
special laws have granted individual rights of suit against
the State (e. g. Act of 25 April, 19o3, P. L. 315), in spite
the constitutional prohibition of special laws "granting to
any corporation, association or individual any special or
exclusive privilege or immunity" (Art. III, Sec. 7). It is
hard to see how an act granting a special right to sue the
State can be reconciled with that prohibition.
Turning to the other States, we find no uniform system
in regard to the treatment of such cases. In Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin, the bringing of
suits against the State is provided for by general laws, and
in Nevada this right is granted to a certain class of
claimants.
In Michigan certain officers constitute a Board of Auditors, to pass upon all claims, and their decision is final.
This board necessarily lacks the independence of a court,
and its decisions cannot be reviewed on appeal. In Utah
there is a similar board called a Board of Examiners.
In Idaho and North Carolina the Supreme Court entertains suits against the State, but its decisions are mere recommendations to the Legislature.
The Constitutions of California, Delaware, Kentucky,
North Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming contain practically
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the same provisions as does that of Pennsylvania, but, as
with us, there is no general law granting a right of suit.
In fact, the Tennessee Legislature has gone so far as to
prohibit such suits.

The Florida and Oregon Constitutions authorize the Legislature to grant a right of suit by general law only, but
apparently this has never been done in either State. The
Louisiana Constitution regulates laws conferring a right of
suit, but apparently contemplates special acts only.
The Constitutions of Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Vermont are silent
on the subject of suits against the State, but while this
silence would not prevent the Legislatures from authorizing
such suits, this seems to be done only in individual instances.
Finally, the Constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois
and West Virginia strictly forbid all suits against the State,
for whatever cause. It is hard to imagine what the citizens
of those States expect to gain by positively forbidding
claimants to obtain justice as a matter of right, and forcing
them to, seek it of the Legislature as a special favour.
Taking it all in all, it is rather a melancholy reflection
that less than a quarter of our States are willing to follow
the example of the National Government, and to meet their
citizens on equal grounds in their own courts, for it is obviously for the advantage of the government, as well as of
the citizen, that this should be done. The purpose for
which the Court of Claims exists is well expressed in its
motto, placed above the Chief Justice's seat on the bench,
"Reipublicae Civibusque"--a permanent declaration that
the court acts both for the nation on the one hand, and for
the citizens on the other, by determining, through orderly
legal procedure, without fear or favor, the respective rights
of each in civil causes. In so acting, the court not merely
reconciles, as far as possible, the differences which arise
between the two, but also helps to develop and preserve, on
the part of government officers, a due regard for the rights

394

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL RECOURSE

cf all citizens, and on the part Qf the citizens, the feeling
that the government is not a stranger to them, which will
cheat them whenever it can, and which they may fairly
cheat in their turn, but that it is their government, administered in their interest, dealing fairly with them, and
according them, through its courts, as perfect justice as
fallible human beings can administer. Who can deny that
such a court is an important agency in maintaining that
confidence of the citizen in his government, and that public
respect for it, without which no government can hope to
permanently endure?
Every lawyer who cares for the honor of his profession
must feel, however, that the magnitude of the interests involved in the litigation which takes place in the Court of
Claims demands that the legal staff of the United States,
those who are called upon to represent it in that court, should
receive the same fair treatment which is accorded the scient;fic and medical staffs and the officers of the army and
navy. In the Geological Survey, for instance, or the many
scientific positions under the Department of Agriculture,
appointments and promotions are made for proved merit
and fitness, and the political views of the appointee are not
inquired into. So with the surgeons of the army and navy,
not to mention the officers of the various arms of those
services. In short, the men who serve their country in
every learned profession except the law are free to hold
such political opinions as they think fit; yet in spite of the
fact that the legal profession, above all others, trains men
to take broad views, to look on all sides of every question,
and to divest themselves of all irrelevant prejudices as
regards the performance of their work, the professional staff
of the Department of Justice is to this day a purely partisan
body. Occasionally men are retained as special counsel
without regard to politics, but every permanent professional
position in that department is treated as party spoils. To
change one's legal counsel pending important litigation,
merely because of a change of parties in the control of the
administration, is at least as unwise as it would be to change
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military officers, for the same cause, during a campaign;
and yet the former is the invariable practice, in spite of the
fact that politics cannot possibly enter into the question of
the government's rights under a contract, or whether a particular invention is covered by a patent, or whether the patent claimed to cover it is valid, or any other of the thousand
kinds of questions involved in suits in the Court of Claims,
Twenty-six years ago the pressure of public opinion compelled Congress to provide for a non-partisan system of
appointing and promoting department clerks, letter carriers,
and other civil servants of the lower grades, although any
man of fair intelligence can learn the duties of such positions in a few days, or at most a few weeks; and there is
all the more reason that such a system should be followed
ii the case of men who have given years of laborious study
to qualify them for their work. It is to be hoped that in
time the Bar of this country will insist that those of its
members who may seek to serve their country in their profession shall stand on the same level with the men of other
learned professions, and not be cast aside merely because,
in the exercise of their private judgment, they may have
adopted political views which do not conform precisely to
those of the particular administration which chances to be
in power.

